Procylicality and the new Basel Accord
A long-standing concern with regard to the setting of minimum prudential capital requirements for banks is that pressure on bank capital in a recession (because specific provisions and write-offs will reduce bank capital, if not absorbed in earnings) could, given the minimum capital requirements, lead to cutbacks in bank lending. The introduction of the Basel Accord in 1988, marked a worldwide adoption of minimum capital requirements that had to be met at all times. A number of academic studies were carried out after the recession in the early 1990s to see if the minimum standards had indeed created procyclical effects. It would not be surprising if the introduction of capital requirements had some effect on lending, through encouraging banks to focus on the true cost of some of the riskier loans. But the concern was that fixed capital requirements could have significantly exacerbated the 1990 recession by creating a credit crunch and this was the focus of a number of academic papers. This literature is surveyed in a study carried out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [Jackson, Patricia, et al (1999) ] and the conclusion for the US was that particular sectors such as real estate or small businesses may have been affected by pressure on bank capital [Hancock and Wilcox (1997) , Hancock and Wilcox (1998) and Rosengren (1997a, 1997b) ]. But there was no evidence of widespread problems.
The relatively muted effects found, however, probably reflect the fact that earnings are the first buffer against the need to raise provisions or write-off loans, limiting the impact of recessions on bank capital and therefore the procyclical effects. Also, modest falls in capital may be covered by increased use of subordinated debt which is included in Tier 2 capital. The new Accord which will be introduced in 2005 could, however, have a profound effect on the dynamics of bank capital and lending in recessions. In contrast to the current Accord where, for a given quantum of lending to a particular set of borrowers, the capital requirement is invariant over time, under the new Accord the capital requirements will depend on the current risk assessments of those borrowers. If borrowers are downgraded in a recession, then the capital requirements faced by the bank will rise. This would be in addition to the possible reduction in the bank's capital because of write-offs and specific provisions. This paper examines the possible extent of variation in bank capital requirements for different profiles of bank portfolio, and sets this against the excess capital maintained by the banks, taking into account the possible reduction which might be experienced in a recession. The extent to which banks need to downgrade borrowers in a recession will depend on the way in which borrowers are assigned to a rating band under the new Accord. If borrowers are assigned to a rating under the assumption that economic conditions prevailing when the loan was made were likely to hold over the life of a loan, then there would be substantial downgrading if economic conditions deteriorated (and vice versa if conditions improved). In contrast, if banks, when assessing the credit-worthiness of the borrower, consider the effect of a change in the economic climate, then downgrades might be rather less.
The paper uses a general equilibrium model to assess the costs/benefits for the banks of pursuing different approaches to setting ratings and therefore whether they would voluntarily choose to adopt a forward-looking approach.
A simplified version of Tsomocos (2001) is used. The model includes heterogeneity of economic agents and endogenous default. By introducing weights for bank assets which depend on the level of default, we are able to assess the effect on bank profitability and welfare of the choice of different rating approaches (countercyclical, procyclical and neutral) by the banks under the proposed new Accord. Section 2 sets out the background on the proposed new Basel Accord, section 3 examines the effect of the new approach on bank capital requirements over the cycle, depending on the rating approach chosen by the banks. Section 4 summarises the Tsomocos general equilibrium model, sets out the modelling of default and default dependent risk weights and examines which rating scheme banks would choose to adopt. Section 5 considers the forward-looking approach to ratings. Section 6 sets out the conclusion.
Basel Accord
The Basel Accord sets the minimum capital requirements for most significant banks worldwide. The current Accord, agreed in 1988, is based on only a limited differentiation of risk using broad categories of exposure -with an 8% charge for all exposures except OECD government, OECD interbank and under one-year interbank and residential mortgages. The requirements reflects the type of loan and not the riskiness of the loan (except for the OECD/non OECD distinction) and therefore will not change if the creditworthiness of borrowers deteriorates.
In contrast, the new Accord on which the Committee is currently working will differentiate exposures according to the riskiness of the borrower. Capital requirements will therefore rise if the creditworthiness of borrowers deteriorates. The new Accord will offer two approaches for the setting of risk-based capital requirements. Under a standardised approach, banks will allocate borrowers to bands according to the external rating of the borrower (for example, from a rating agency) -see below. (*There is also an option which uses the rating of the sovereign to rate banks)
Under an alternative, internal ratings-based approach, banks will allocate borrowers to bands probability of default. The Committee set out a function for calculating the capital requirement for each loan based on the probability of default (PD) of the borrower (set by the bank) and the loss given default (LGD) which would be experienced were the borrower to fail. Under the foundation approach the Committee would set the loss given default, and under an advanced approach the bank would set it. The capital requirements were calculated by the Committee, using credit risk models, for losses over a one-year horizon with a 99.5% confidence level. It was assumed that the correlation between the returns on different corporate exposures was 20%. This was based on information on correlations used by the industry and also research carried out by the Committee on correlations implicit in economic capital allowed by firms. There was also an add-on to cover measurement error (the models tend to underestimate the tail events [see Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2001) ] and the low loss absorbing capacity of Tier 2 capital. The banks' economic capital models assume that equity will be used to ensure a target solvency level is attained. In contrast, under the Basel Accord up to half the requirement can be met with subordinated debt. The following risk-weight function, based on this, was put forward for the corporate portfolio in the second consultation paper issued by the Committee (add refs).
Benchmark risk weight = 976.5 x N (1.118 x G (PD) +1.288)x(1 + .0470 x (1 -PD) / PD 0.44 ).
Here, N(.) denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution and G(.) is the inverse of this.
PD is the one year default rate.
[A short explanation of the parts of the formula will be added.]
Under this risk weight function the capital requirement for an unsecured exposure (50% LGD under the foundation approach) rises steeply as the probability of default increases. Under the treatment for retail set out in the second consultative paper, the risk weights proposed were half those put forward for corporate for a given PD and banks could set their own LGD -average LGDs for non-mortgage retail are around 75% and those for mortgage retail are around 25%. This gives capital requirements which rise somewhat less steeply with PD than is the case for the corporate book. Since the release of the consultation paper the Committee has been carrying out further work on both the corporate and retail curves -the corporate weighting function has been adjusted to take into account the fact that small and medium enterprise (SME) exposures account for a heavy proportion of the loans at higher PDs. These exposures have greater idiosyncratic risk which reduces the correlation for loans in the higher PD bands. The Committee is now considering setting correlation as a declining function of PD from 20% to 10%, using the following formula. The Committee is also considering calibrating the capital requirements using a 99.9% confidence level rather than 99.5% plus an add-on, which delivers a flatter curve. This still delivers a solvency level equivalent to a low investment grade rating because part of the capital held to deliver it is subordinated debt not equity -which was one of the reasons for the add-on.
Corporate Capital Charges Under CP2

Retail Capital Charges Under CP2
Following research on retail, the Committee is considering setting correlation for nonmortgage retail as a declining function of the PD -declining from 15% to 4%. In contrast, for mortgages a fixed correlation of 15% is thought appropriate. The Committee is also considering calculating capital charges for non-mortgage retail on the basis of Unexpected Loss (UL) only.
The chart below sets out the new corporate and retail curves under consideration. 
Capital Charges Under Current Proposals
The effect on bank capital requirements over a cycle
With risk weight a rising function of PD, an overall weakening in the credit quality of a bank's portfolio will result in an increase in that bank's overall capital requirements. Indeed, this risk sensitivity is an important part of the new capital framework. But a side effect will be that capital requirements are likely to rise in recessions because more borrowers are likely to be downgraded than upgraded. Banks will have to meet this higher capital requirement at a time when their overall capital is under pressure because of write-offs and specific provisions.
The pressure on individual banks will depend on the extent of downgrading in their loan book and the headroom they have to accommodate an increase in the minimum capital requirements. This would depend on the amount of excess capital maintained in better times and access to capital markets for new equity or subordinated debt.
1 Likely downgrading
An important policy question is therefore the likely extent of loan downgrading for different banks and banking systems in recessions and the consequent increase in capital requirements. This question is explored by taking the profiles of loan books across different PD bands seen for banks in different countries and across the G10, and applying recession ratings transition matrices to produce a stressed quality distribution. The change in the capital requirements under the new Basel Accord can then be calculated from the two quality distributions.
Information is available on the quality distribution of banks' corporate loan books from various sources. The Federal Reserve Board carried out a survey of the distribution of loans by rating band for a number of US banks, reported in Gordy (2000). The average and high quality distributions are shown below. A few banks publish ratings distributions -the distribution for Deutsche is shown in the table under high quality European. We have also obtained the quality distribution for the corporate portfolio of a large UK bank and that is also set out below.
In November, the Basel Committee put on the BIS website the results of a quantitative impact study, looking at the effect that the new Basel Accord proposals would have on the minimum capital requirements of a sample of large internationally active G10 banks. The study includes weighted 1 average information on the quality distributions of corporate, interbank and sovereign portfolios held by these banks. For corporate exposures 36% are in AAA, AA and A, 30% in BBB and 34% below BBB. This has been used to estimate an allocation across the finer bands used in the FRB survey which is included in Table 2 . *To be added.
All these quality distributions, with the exception of that for the G10, which includes Japan, relate to a period of strong economic growth.
In order to estimate how these quality distributions would change in a recession, we have stressed them using the one-year ratings transition matrices (calculated from Moody's ratings) for business cycle troughs in the period 31.12.70 to 31.12.97 -the years with growth in the lowest third [produced by Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000)]. They calculated two stress transition matrices, one for US industrials and one for the universe of Moody's ratings. The US matrix has been used for the US portfolios, and the matrix for the universe of ratings has been used for the other portfolios -the matrices used are shown in the attached Annex.
Moody's ratings take into account the possibility that economic conditions could change adversely for the borrower. Moody's state that "in coming to a conclusion [on the rating] rating committees routinely examine a variety of scenarios. Moody's ratings deliberately do not incorporate a single, internally consistent economic forecast. They aim rather to measure the issuer's ability to meet debt obligations against economic scenarios reasonably adverse to the issuer's specific circumstances." They can therefore be thought of as akin to a through-the-cycle rating approach. The fact that even so there are more downgrades in a recession reflects the uncertain impact of stress periods on different barriers/indicators.
Applying these transition matrices, the quality distributions for the bank corporate portfolios set out in Table 2 and the implied distribution for the G10 would change to the following: Applying the Basel CP2 and the possibly modified corporate weights this would give rise to the following increase in capital requirements for the various portfolios *To be added.
Note these figures are based on low growth as well as recession years. [We will be revising the data to cover only recession years which should give a larger increase.]
The CP2 curves would therefore seem likely to lead to a significant increase in bank capital requirements in low growth periods. The modified curves would moderate the effect but it would still be sizeable.
Many banks claim that rather than replicating the rating agencies' approach of through-the-cycle ratings, they carry out point-in-time ratings which assume that the economic conditions prevailing when the loan is made will remain unchanged over the life of the load. This would tend to give a more extreme path through the cycle. Point-in-time ratings might produce results across the economic cycle more akin to those from a Merton approach to rating where an option pricing method is used to estimate the default likelihood of the borrower from the current equity price and current balance sheet information. The paper [Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2001) ] showed that capital requirements produced using this method are considerably more volatile than those based on Moody's ratings. This would amplify the degree of procyclicality in the capital requirements. [More material to be added on extent of amplification.]
An important issue therefore is whether, as point-in-time ratings will lead to more procyclical effects, banks will voluntarily choose to adopt through-the-cycle ratings. This is explored below.
The preferred rating approach for a bank
To look at the question of the preferred rating approach from a bank's perspective we employ a simplified version of the general equilibrium model set out in Tsomocos (2001) . The closest methodological precursor to this model is the work of Martin Shubik (1999) , who introduced a central bank with exogenously specified stocks of money, and cash-in-advance constraints in a strategic market game. Grandmont (1983) also introduced a banking sector into general equilibrium with overlapping generations and he pointed out the inefficiency of trade with money. The commercial banking sector of this model follows closely Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) . The modelling of money and default in an incomplete markets framework is akin to the models developed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2000) . None of the previous papers incorporates a competitive commercial banking sector, and focuses on financial instability. Finally, default is modelled as in Shubik and Wilson (1977) . None of the models focus on loan rating and procyclicality.
The Model
A multiperiod general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents has been used to enable the study of multiple market interactions and the identification of various channels that are affected by specific changes of policy parameters. It enables the main effects on the optimising behaviour of the agents and market forces to be studied. Heterogeneity permits us to conduct full-fledged welfare analysis.
The model consists of three sectors (the household, corporate and banking sectors), two time periods, two possible future scenarios and a financial market with one single asset, assumed to be default free. The corporate sector can be thought of as firms which both borrow from banks and sell marketable financial assets. Moreover, the banking sector raises funds by borrowing from the market and raising deposits from the household sector. These proceeds are used to make loans to the corporate sector and to buy marketable assets. Therefore, the financial structure of the economy is one of complete markets with two assets (loans and default free assets) and two states of nature (good and bad). Households and banks maximise consumption and profits respectively.
Agent α represents the household sector that maximises consumption in all periods and future states and borrows from the credit markets to achieve this. On the other hand, agent β -the corporate sector, is assumed to care only about consumption in period zero and in the 'bad' state (state 2) of period one. It represents a sector which only consumes when its investment in the asset market does not generate a positive return. Finally, the banking sector, agent γ, maximises profits only in the second period. With this framework, we capture the idea of a banking sector that, on average, maximises profits over the medium/long horizon and that avoids speculative behaviour in the short run. The endowments for each of the three sectors are presented in Annex 2.
Uncertainty in the model comes from stochastic commodity and monetary endowments in the two future scenarios and from stochastic asset payoffs. The private and capital endowments, as well as the money supply in the economy, are also given. The optimisation problems and the balance sheet of the banking sector are presented in Annex 3. Thus, equilibrium in our model is defined as the solution to the three optimisation problems presented in Annex 2 plus the satisfaction of the six market clearing conditions (prices of goods at t=0, s=1, s=2, interbank market, loans market and asset market) that are presented in Annex 4.
Capital requirements of the banking sector are modelled as an extra constraint in the banks' optimisation problem. In particular, it is assumed here that shareholders' funds are fixedbanks cannot raise extra capital (in other words, the numerator in the Capital Adequacy Ratio is assumed to be constant). This is a reasonable assumption for periods of economic stress. Even in booms banks have to make a good business case to shareholders making it difficult to raise extra capital simply to meet their capital requirements. Thus our aim is to study the effects of changes in regulatory risk-weighted assets -i.e., the denominator in the risk asset ratio.
We now provide a formal description of the model. 
→ ℜ
We allow the banking sector to default on interbank loans and the corporate sector on commercial loans. Thus, the payoffs given bankruptcy penalties for the corporate and the banking sectors respectively are:
The payoffs of the household and corporate sectors are functions of consumption, , whereas of the banking are functions of profits, π . 
All markets of Annex 4 clear.
Endogenous default
Default is often assumed to be exogenous (e.g., Blum-Hellwig model) or derived implicitly from a particular equilibrium outcome. In this case default probabilities are typically calculated from historical data -for example the ratio of past defaults over the total amount of loans extended. The disadvantage with this method is that default probabilities are not explained but rather assumed to be a simple arithmetic average over whichever past period is chosen. We follow a different strategy by allowing the corporate sector and commercial banks to default in equilibrium. Therefore, we are able to investigate equilibria with active default whilst maintaining a solution.
We introduce default penalties, modelled as linear functions proportional to the size of default, that are subtracted from the utility function of the economic agents (corporate sector and commercial banks). Equivalently, one may incorporate default penalties by foreclosing parts of the endowments of debtors that have defaulted. Thus, by raising bankruptcy penalties, or equivalently by increasing the amount of endowments confiscated in case of default, we effectively increase the marginal disutility of default. The inclusion of differential default penalties is important because they are not uniform across countries or sectors reflecting differences in banking codes (e.g., Chapter 11 in the USA).
The upshot of this strategy is that default is an endogenously determined phenomenon in equilibrium resulting from the optimising choices of the banks, corporate sector and the interacting forces of the market. Consequently, default probabilities in each market are equal to aggregate default over the total amount of loans extended in equilibrium, i.e., the amount of actual default relative to the total amount of transactions in the respective markets, given the forward-looking behaviour of banks and the corporate sector. Furthermore, we use the size of corporate sector default as a proxy for the business cycle. In particular, high aggregate corporate default is considered to indicate recession periods in the economy whereas low levels the opposite.
In this setting, not all individuals can default in all the assets they hold. Households do not default and they only use their initial monetary endowments for making deposits in the banks. The corporate sector, on the other hand, take loans from banks on which they may default and invest in assets which are assumed to be default free. They will choose an optimal level of repayment for these loans ( is 1 -default rate), as a percentage of the total state 1 (state 2) outstanding debt, so that they maximise their utility. In the model the corporate sector, however, is not allowed to default in the asset market 
Introducing default varying risk weights
Under the proposed Accord, although the regulators will set constant risk weights for all loans assessed to have the same probability of default (PD), the risk weight for a particular loan will depend on the PD band into which the loan is slotted by the bank. This gives rise to the potential for time varying risk weights. To deal with this we introduce a proxy for banks' portfolio riskiness based on expected default of their customers.
As shown in the next section, the credit rating will be based only on the expected repayment levels of non-household borrowers from banks (corporate sector), n , i.e., for simplicity we ignore bank defaults.
Thus, in this model, given specific bankruptcy penalties, the corporate sector will rationally compare the marginal benefits and marginal costs of defaulting and will choose their optimal repayment levels accordingly. The corporate sector's default decisions on their bank loans will affect the capital requirements of the banking sector and this, in turn, will affect the credit expansion in the economy. In this sense, both banks and the corporate sector could choose higher levels of default than the original ones, if it were advantageous.
The contribution of the present work is not only the introduction of risk-sensitive capital ratios 6 but also through using a model with endogenous and multidimensional default, we are able to assess the effects of different policies on the decisions of the corporate sector and banks (who are utility and profit maximisers respectively in making their decisions and interacting with each other). It is possible to use this model to determine what rating system banks would choose in order to maximise their utility.
We examine which of the following ratings approaches banks would choose to adopt.
(1) constant risk weights per loan over the cycle; (2) procyclical risk weights -which are higher in a recession; (3) countercyclical risk weights -which are lower in a recession.
The default-varying risk-weights regulatory regimes (a) constant (neutral) risk weights
This will be our benchmark case. The capital adequacy ratio of a bank in this economy is defined by:
where c stands for shareholders' funds available to meet the capital requirement, w γ γ i 's are the risk weights that the regulator chooses for each band, and because loans remain in the same probability of default band over the cycle this gives a constant risk weight for each asset, i=1,2, m is the amount of credit extension from banks to the corporate sector, and represents banks' investment in the default-free asset markets. (Although the assets are assumed to be default free there is always risk involved in their payoffs hence w γ b 2 has a value.) r is the loan interest rate. The model was calibrated using 100% for w 1 and 25% for w 2 . 100% is risk weight for most private sector loans under the current Accord and the Basel Committee has said that the new Accord will be calibrated to deliver the same average risk weight giving an 8% capital charge. 25% is approximately the weight on high quality short term securities issued by banks or corporates held in a banks' trading book.
(b) procyclical default-dependent risk weights
In this case, we replace the risk weight on loans to the corporate sector with w 1 *. This is equal to the initial weight, w 1 , plus the linear term ( 2 . 0 4 . 0 + β n − ), i.e., it is set pro-cyclically w 1 *= f ( β n ) with f' < 0 (i.e., the risk weight increases as corporate default increases), as it is shown below. The premium added to the risk weight w 1 varies between -0.2 and +0.2. The procyclical nature of this scheme is easily seen. In particular, in boom periods an average corporate sector's repayment level of 1 (i.e., loans are upgraded with respect to their credit because of lower credit risk due to full repayment) will cause a decrease in w 1 of 0.2 (i.e. -0.4 + 0.2), allowing banks to expand their loans. Conversely, in recessions when the average repayment of loans could be close to 0, (loans are downgraded because of higher credit risk) the risk weight w 1 would increase by 0.2, tightening banks' capital requirements and forcing banks to reduce loans (i.e., over the cycle, the risk weight is in the range )
(c) countercyclical default-dependent risk weights
Finally, by inverting the signs in our equation, we obtain a counter-cyclical policy. Loans move to a lower rating category when current default decreases in the expectation of higher expected credit risk in the future. Thus, the new risk weights are assumed to increase with current repayments (i.e., the higher the amount of loans that are currently expected to be repaid, the less will be expected to be paid in the future hence higher risk weights are assigned to loans). More formally, w 1 *= f ( β n ) with f' > 0, as shown below. 
Comparative statics -evaluating the rating schemes
The comparative static experiments show that there is no "always-optimal" (i.e., first-best) policy in equilibrium. Basically, the preferred rating policy for a bank will change according to the specific point in the economic cycle -i.e., the specific value of the trend component of the risk weights (i.e., w 1 ).
In Figure 5 we show the equilibrium values for the different relevant variables (profits, welfare, credit extension, asset investment, risk weighted assets, total assets, and default levels) for the procyclical and countercyclical rating regimes used by the banks. The Charts in Figure 5 can be compared to those presented in Figure 4 , for the neutral case. The aim of the experiment is to highlight the changes in the variables, if any, under the three different rating regimes.
There are two variables where the differences between the three rating regimes are very noticeable. We observe a bank portfolio substitution effect between credit extension and asset investment (figure 5b) but, interestingly, we observe that the countercyclical scheme reduces the amplitude of the switch. This substitution effect occurs when the risk-weight on loans increases relative to the one on default-free assets, encouraging banks to switch from making loans to purchasing default free assets. Thus the higher the weight on loans, the stronger is the switch from loan investments to default-free assets. Under the countercyclical regime the allocation of bank portfolios is more equally balanced between default free assets and loans. The corporate sector decides on their rate of default taking into account the rate they pay on loans, which reflects the risk weight, which in turn is influenced by the rating scheme chosen by the banks.
In order to examine which rating scheme would be chosen by the banks it is necessary to consider the effect of different schemes on bank profits and corporate sector default. In order to show the differences under the three regimes Charts 1, 2 and 3 show how profits depend on default for different values of w 1 -i.e., different points in the economic cycle. These show that the countercyclical or the procyclical rating schemes would be preferred to the neutral rating scheme because profits are more responsive to changes in default.
Under a countercyclical rating scheme, banks will increase the risk weight on loans in booms which will in turn lead to an increase in the interest rate paid by the corporate sector on loans. This leads the corporate sector to reduce their borrowing, which reduces the default dispersion of the corporate sector and increases bank expected profits.
In a recession, banks will reduce the risk weight on loans leading to a reduction in the interest rate paid by the corporate sector on loans. This leads the corporate sector to borrow more than would have been the case under other bank rating schemes and default rises. However, it remains below the levels that would have been seen with other bank rating schemes. Under the countercyclical rating scheme bank profits are, overall, higher across the cycle than they would be under either of the other rating schemes.
Under a procyclical rating scheme, banks will reduce the risk weight on loans in booms, increasing borrowing which will result in increased default dispersion by the corporate sector and will reduce bank expected profits. In recessions banks will increase the risk weight on loans leading the corporate sector to reduce borrowing and therefore to default less than otherwise. The procyclical regime delivers profits which are less affected by default rates than under the countercyclical approach but overall, across the cycle, bank profitability would be lower than under the countercyclical scheme for ratings.
Under the neutral, through the cycle, rating scheme the risk weights on loans would be invariant to the point in the economic cycle. This regime would manifest monotonic behaviour in booms and in recessions (Charts 2 and 3) but would not do so in the aggregate (Chart 1). During expansionary periods it would resemble the countercyclical scheme and in recessions it would resemble the procyclical scheme. However, overall, it would deliver lower bank profits than either the countercyclical or the procyclical schemes.
In the calibration of the model which has been used (with w 1 = 1002 and w 2 = 25%) the total profit of the bank would be ½% lower under the neutral rather than the countercyclical or procyclical ratings approach, with countercyclical delivery slightly higher profit than procyclical. This may seem a relatively small difference but translates into a sizeable amount for a large bank -£35 mn per annum for a £7 bn profit bank.
These results show that given freedom to choose any rating scheme, banks would tend to opt for a countercyclical approach. Under the new Accord the supervisors will be assessing the plausibility of ratings transitions and default outturns per band. Importantly banks will also be required under Pillar 3 to publish the allocation of loans per probability of default band and the default outturns per band which will exert market discipline on the process. A rating approach which was countercyclical, where ratings were reduced in stress periods, would almost certainly not be allowed.
This will leave the banks with a choice between a through-the-cycle approach to rating or a point in time approach where the ratings for individual loans change markedly over the cycle, peaking in stress conditions. The model strongly suggests that, given this choice, the banks will opt for procyclical (point in time) ratings to boost profits relative to those under a through-the-cycle approach. 
Welfare effects of the choice in ratings
Thus banks, given the choice of rating scheme, would opt for a countercyclical regime, or if prevented from doing so would opt for a procyclical regime as a second best -see Charts 1-3. However, to maximise welfare or minimise default, the neutral, through-the-cycle, regime would be preferable. This is because under a procyclical or countercyclical regime the change in weights allows banks to transfer the dead-weight loss due to default to the corporate sector and households. The change in weights would be reflected in changes in investment rates and changes in borrower behaviour. The procyclical and countercyclical schemes lead banks to restructure their portfolio quickly when economic conditions change. By transferring the negative impact of a recession to the rest of the economy, banks can reduce the effect on their profits. The essence of this result is not that risk sensitive weights reduce efficiency, and therefore that it would be preferable to maintain Basel I -with the insensitive risk-weight structure.
Relative riskiness of loans on a bank's balance sheet should be reflected in the risk weights. However, there are advantages in having more stable risk weights over time. This points to the importance of rating approaches based on longer horizons which would make it more difficult for banks to free ride by changing ratings frequently to enhance profits.
Forward looking ratings
The likelihood that banks, given a choice of procyclical ratings or through the cycle, would choose the former resulting in welfare costs, points to the need for the supervisors to consider mechanisms which would provide incentives to the banks to adopt a more forward looking approach. It is unlikely that the banks could develop such an accurate through the cycle approach that the risk weighting of individual loans was constant as in the model set out above. The rating agencies try to take into account the effect of possible adverse economic conditions when rating borrowers but, even so, their ratings exhibit some procyclicality. However, point-in-time ratings where banks assume that the economic conditions prevailing at the time of the extension of the loan will remain unchanged would lead to substantially more procyclicality. Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) highlight the need for supervisors to consider rules which promote better measurement of the time dimension of risk, such as longer horizons for risk measurement, the use of stress testing and forward looking provisioning. Haldane, Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) suggest that it would be preferable if bank risk assessments attempted to take into account the economic cycle as a whole. This would not mean forecasting the path of the cycle but assessing the effect of an adverse change in the economic environment on a borrower's creditworthiness when extending credit. Crockett (2000) points out that, although risks usually materialise in recessions, the actual increase in risk would have occurred in the previous upswing. This should be reflected in the banks' capital requirements.
Conclusion
The proposed new Basel Accord, in contrast to the Current Accord, has the potential for time varying risk weights for individual loans. Although the Basel Committee will set fixed weights for loans for a given probability of default for the borrower, banks will choose the probability of default band into which a loan will be slotted. It then becomes very important how the banks assign ratings. Taking the rating agency ratings as an example of a through the cycle approach, which takes into account the possible effect of adverse economic conditions on the borrower when assigning a rating, it can be seen that even this approach could lead to a 15% increase in bank capital requirements in a recession. A point in time approach, where the economic conditions prevailing when the loan was made are assumed to remain unchanged over the life of the loan, could lead to a much greater increase in capital requirements. This would be more akin to the results from a Merton credit risk model, using the current equity price and balance sheet data to calculate the likely default probability for the borrower under an options pricing methodology. These results show that under such an approach capital requirements could increase by x% (we will be doing more work to calculate what this percentage is) in a recession.
Strongly procyclical capital requirements could have severe macro economic effects by creating credit crunches in recessions, thereby exacerbating the economic downturn. An important policy issue is therefore whether banks would choose to adopt more through the cycle ratings, which would moderate the procyclical effects, or whether they would adopt point in time ratings, even though this could lead to an inability to meet demands for credit in a downturn. The general equilibrium approach used in this paper strongly indicates that banks will not choose a through the cycle approach. Given complete freedom they would choose a countercyclical approach, reducing ratings in a recession and if regulators prevent this (as they are almost certain to do under the new Basel Accord) banks will adopt a procyclical (point in time) approach.
Given the welfare costs of a procyclical rating approach by the banks, the authorities will need to find a way of encouraging or requiring banks to adopt a more through the cycle approach. 
ANNEX 1
